McGavin, PA The Holy Father often speaks without a prepared text, and it is amazing how accurately he reads in transcription. This was brilliantly so in Light of the World interviews. Even his brief words at pages 118-119 on condoms - so breathlessly and inaccurately treated in the media - are so cast as to withstand close scrutiny. It is with this recognition that I address his lack of precision and perception in speaking on the question of homosexuality and sacred (...) ordination. (shrink)

The hardest thing in appropriating [a] holistic natural law perspective is to recognise the invisible mean of judgement, which alone contains the limits of all things... The notion of mean and limits - so fundamental to ethics - calls for inner understanding that the nature of the mean cannot be defined 'a priori', because it involves an exercise of judgement, ethical judgement.

New Blackfriars, Volume 103, Issue 1106, Page 483-498, July 2022.

In philosophical use, ‘ethics’ and ‘moral philosophy’ are more closely synonymous—one deriving from Greek, ethikē and the other from Latin moralis. In typical social science paradigms, there generally prevails a consensual sense of contemporary everyday use of ethics, except where earlier usage sustains discourse in terms of morals—as with moral psychology. This article takes a recent publication in this journal by Patrick Welch to propose a ‘conversation’ between theoretic and empirical approaches to ethics and morals. This is illustrated using works (...) by Joseph Ratzinger to suggest a natural law approach that brings together premises and empirics in ethical and moral discourse and action. This kind of integration helps the discovery and owning of truth that is ‘not of one’s own making’. Such a synthetic approach is especially relevant to raising student identity with ethical/moral issues and in assisting their building of psychological structures and processes that support education in ethical/moral reasoning and action. (shrink)

In recent years a large component of my reading has involved difficult texts on theological method, epistemology, and neuro-psychology. What I present in this article in significant respects is a simplified conflation of this reading that contributes some original elements in a paradigmatic approach to 'doing theology'. For this reason, I generally do not engage in specific citations within my text, and instead include at the end of the article some remarks on some of my reading. My main purpose is (...) to use a manner of speaking or writing - using extended metaphors - to make it more accessible to readers who want to 'do theology' in their own lives and in their ministries, rather than grapple with more formal presentations of what is treated. (shrink)

Mapping one's ignorance also has affective benefits. Wherever mastery of knowledge and skills creates professional status, especially in practices that give professional power over clients, there arises a natural pride that rests on what one knows, and a regrettable tendency for authority to develop arrogance. We know the effects: failure to listen, premature dismissal of relevant information, overreaching and overbearing professional conduct, mistakes and the denial of them, and so on. An explicit acknowledgement of ignorance may generate a corrective humility, (...) a desire to see rather than presume understanding, alertness to unforeseen consequences, and openness to alternative approaches. (shrink)

The ethical theory espoused by a philosopher is often dominated by certain implicit epistemological assumptions. These “ways of knowing” may in turn be dominated by personality preferences that give rise to certain preferred worldviews that undergird various philosophies. Such preferred worldviews are seen in We believe positions, stated or unstated. The meaning of these claims about the interconnections of unexamined assumptions and their philosophical implications may be seen through an example. This paper will examine certain crucial aspects of the thought (...) of John Doris, who promotes a form of situationist ethics. This example is intended to be suggestive rather than conclusive. It points to the need for an openness to other epistemological assumptions that might permit a more comprehensive appreciation of what moral agency involves, beyond what arises from the restricted methods of analytical philosophy and a positivist worldview. There have been other efforts to meet the situationist challenge to classical Aristotelian ethics, yet surprisingly little attention has been given to the role of implicit epistemologies and unexamined psychologies. This paper offers a critical examination of these prior We believe positions. (shrink)